Political dynasties’ hold in party-list systems undermine constitutional mandate

By Pexcel John Bacon

THE TIGHTENING grip of political dynasties in the party-list system reflects its departure from its mandate under the 1987 Constitution to represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, political analysts said.

The party-list system was created to give meaningful representation to sectors that usually lack sufficient funds, machinery, and influence to compete in elections, according to Jaime B. Naval, political science professor at University of the Philippines.

“It was meant to widen the doors of Congress for those historically kept outside,” he said in a Facebook Messenger chat.

“Instead, it has increasingly become another avenue through which established political families and entrenched political interests acquire additional seats and expand their influence.”

This followed a report by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) published on May 25, which flagged the increasing number of party-list representatives linked to political dynasties.

According to the report, titled “7 reasons why the party-list system serves dynasties, not democracy,” one in four party-list representatives are related to sitting members of either the House of Representatives or the Senate, and in some cases, both. Some party-lists even served as a “launch pad,” enabling political dynasties to extend their power into the third or fourth generation.

According to Mr. Naval, this is the result of a combination of several factors including the expansion of eligibility requirements after the Supreme Court’s Atong Paglaum ruling in 2013, which allowed party-lists to participate without originating from marginalized groups or underrepresented sectors.

He also linked this to the absence of an anti-dynasty law, weak institutionalization of political parties, and the lack of safeguards to maintain the sectoral character of the system.

“The result is a profound irony. A mechanism intended to democratize representation is increasingly being used by those who already possess political power, resources, and access,” he said.

An anti-dynasty measure, which seeks to prohibit spouses and relatives up to the second degree of consanguinity or affinity from simultaneously running for or holding elective positions in the same locality, is poised to hurdle the House.

The PCIJ report, however, noted the measure is silent on party-lists, which could allow members of dynasties to run for party-list seats.

Mr. Naval said that the main issue is not the right of political dynasties to participate in politics, but their dominance in a mechanism specifically designed to give space to sectors that lack representation.

“The real question is whether they should be allowed to dominate a mechanism specifically designed to level the political playing field for those who historically lacked representation,” he said.

To restore the purpose of the party-list system, Mr. Naval recommended stricter sectoral qualification requirements, greater transparency in the political and familial affiliations of candidates, stronger campaign finance regulations, and other safeguards against what he called elite capture.

“The party-list system should primarily serve the underrepresented, not provide additional representation to those who are already represented,” he said.

Meanwhile, Eric Daniel C. de Torres, political science professor of the University of the East, told BusinessWorld that the party-list system has created a “vacuum” that political dynasties used to expand their power.

“As time went by, there was a vacuum that happened that dynastic families saw the party-list system as an opportunity to extend their power,” Mr. de Torres said in a Facebook Messenger chat.

He said the current situation shows that the party-list system is becoming an extension of the power of political dynasties through the creation of regional, provincial, and locally party-list groups.

Mr. de Torres said that this results in the blurring of true sectoral representation and the use of resources at the local level that favor powerful families.

“The net effect is, of course, resources such soft and hard projects are channeled through their respective localities,” he added.